Exchange rate puzzle in New Zealand: New evidence by Hu, Baiding et al.
B. Hu, Y. Lin and P. Dalziel / Journal of Economic Research 24 (2019) 223-246  223 
 
Exchange rate puzzle in New Zealand: New evidence* 
Baiding Hui1 
Faculty of Agribusiness and Commerce, Lincoln University,  
New Zealand 
Yingjie Liniiⅱ 
Library, Teaching and Learning, Lincoln University, New Zealand 
Paul Dalzieliii 
AERU, Lincoln University, New Zealand 
 
Abstract  
This paper adopts an event-study approach that utilises a combination 
of the asset pricing model of the exchange rate due to Engel and West 
(2010) and a state space model to examine the impact of monetary 
policy shocks on the change of the New Zealand exchange rate. We 
find evidence to support the “exchange rate puzzle” (ERP) originally 
coined by Grilli and Roubini (1995). The ERP in the New Zealand 
context was also found in Wilkinson et al. (2001). Using newer data, 
the present study is able to account for the role of the recent global 
financial crisis (GFC) in influencing the nexus between the exchange 
rate and interest rate. It is found that the GFC had a mediating effect 
on the ERP, showing the exchange rate responded asymmetrically to 
monetary policy shocks.  
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1 Introduction 
New Zealand is a small open economy with a significant tradable sector. 
Consequently, fluctuations in the exchange rate, calculated as foreign 
currency against one New Zealand dollar, can have large macroeconomic 
impacts. There is constant pressure from manufacturers in the country to 
have the exchange rate increased via some domestic monetary measure. 
Since March 1999 the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ) has adopted 
Official Cash Rate (OCR) as the monetary policy instrument. It is often 
suggested that the Reserve Bank should ease monetary policy (lower the 
OCR) in an attempt to raise the exchange rate. It is against this 
background that the present paper seeks to shed light on the relationship 
between the OCR and the exchange rate in the New Zealand context. 
Grilli and Roubini (1995) find that while positive innovations in U.S. 
interest rates lead to an impact appreciation of the U.S. dollar (USD), 
positive innovations in the interest rates of the other G-7 countries are 
associated with an impact depreciation of their currency. The authors coin 
this finding an “exchange rate puzzle” (ERP). They offer two explanations 
for such a puzzle; one is that the U.S. is the “leader” country in the setting 
of monetary policy for the G-7 area, while the other countries are 
“followers”. The other explanation suggests endogenous policy reaction to 
underlying inflationary shocks that are a cause of exchange rate 
depreciation. Wilkinson et al. (2001), using data on the New Zealand (NZ) 
exchange rates from 1985 to 1998, found that contractionary monetary 
policy may lead to a depreciation of the New Zealand Dollar (NZD) rather 
than an appreciation, hence the existence of ERP. Zettelmeyer (2004), using 
a more up-to-date data set ending in August 1999, found that the NZ-US 
exchange rate reacted to short-term interest rate changes triggered by 
monetary policy shocks in the direction showing the absence of the ERP. 
The contrast of the findings from the two studies may be attributable 
to the difference in their approaches; the former uses a Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) model while the latter an event study analysis, which 
necessarily implies a different reconstruction of monetary policy shocks. 
To avoid the criticisms on VAR which will be elaborated in the next 
section, this paper adopts a combination of the event-study approach and 
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an asset pricing model of the exchange rate (Engel and West, 2010) to 
examine the impact of monetary policy shocks on the change of the 
exchange rate. The exchange rate is defined as the value of the USD in 
terms of the NZD (a rise in the exchange rate is a depreciation of the 
NZD). The present research uses changes in market OCR expectations as 
the measure of monetary policy shock. With the asset pricing model, we 
are able to extend Zettelmeyer’s work to account for the effects on the 
exchange rate of US asset returns, risk-free returns and currency risk 
premium. Vithessonthi (2014) finds that the Thai baht and the Japanese 
yen exchange rate returns reacted asymmetrically to monetary policy 
surprises during the recent Global Financial Crisis1  (GFC) period in 
relation to the non-financial crisis period. Our sample is collected for the 
period October 2003 – January 2014, which enables us to test if there is any 
GFC effect on the NZD-USD exchange rate behaviour.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a brief literature 
review on two approaches with which the relationship between monetary 
policy shocks and exchange rates are investigated. It presents empirical 
evidence for and against the ERP. Section 3 elaborates the modelling 
framework and estimation procedures. Section 4 describes the data and 
discusses the empirical results, with some concluding remarks contained 
in Section 5.  
2 Literature review 
2.1 Identification of monetary policy shocks: VAR vs Event study 
 
Two approaches are used to measure the impact of monetary policy 
shocks on exchange rates. One dwells on the VAR framework which 
includes the Structural Vector Autoregression (SVAR) model and the 
Vector Error Correction Model (VECM). This approach is commonly used 
to examine the long run dynamic effects of monetary policy shocks on 
exchange rates. The other is the event-study method, which is typically 
                                                                  
1 For the present study, the GFC period refers to the period from the 3rd quarter 2007 through the 
2nd quarter 2011 when the US QE2 stopped. We are of the opinion that the US QE policy would 
affect the NZ-US relative returns.  
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used to examine the short run effects or the same day effects of monetary 
policy changes on exchange rates. The fundamental difference between the 
two approaches is in the way that monetary policy shocks are constructed. 
In the VAR (SVAR) model, the monetary policy shock is measured by the 
disturbance term (the structural disturbance) pertaining to the monetary 
variable equation, for example, the short-term interest rate equation, 
subject to imposition of identifying restrictions. While with the event 
study approach, the monetary policy shock is measured as the unexpected 
change in the monetary policy variable within an event window.  
Despite the fact that the VAR model is commonly used to examine the 
relationship between monetary policy and the exchange rate, many have 
expressed dissatisfaction with it. Rudebusch (1998)’s criticisms on the VAR 
approach point out that the monetary policy equation or monetary 
reaction equation in the VAR system would use final and revised data to 
model policy reactions, while in the real world policy makers had to react 
to initial releases of data. This point is also shared by Brunner (2000). 
Moreover, the significance of lagged variables in the VARs suggested that 
the central bank would react to old information systematically, which is 
unlikely in reality. A number of studies (for example, Engel and Frankel, 
1984; Hardouvelis, 1984; Hakkio and Pearce, 1985; and Ito and Roley, 1987) 
noted that in comparison with the VAR approach, an event study has 
better outcomes on isolating the economic news’ effects from the effects of 
monetary policy shocks on the exchange rate. 
Zettelmeyer (2004) used changes in short-term interest rates to measure 
monetary policy shock after controlling for potential endogeneity of 
monetary policy actions (OCR announcements) and other shocks that 
might have also affected the interest rates. Specifically, Zettelmeyer (2004) 
argues that three month interest rates are used as a policy measure 
because they are sufficiently short to reflect the policy targets that the 
authorities set for the immediate future, but at the same time sufficiently 
long to react only to the extent that changes in the policy rate were 
unanticipated. Zettelmeyer’s approach is to instrument the 90-day interest 
rate to obtain the monetary policy shock to the exchange market. The 
instrumental variable is the direction of underlying central bank policy, 
which takes values, -1, 0 and 1 as formed in Bonato et al. (1999), for a 
regression similar to equation (8). Since this particular instrumental 
variable primarily shows the intention of the policy announcement, and 
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such an intention is subject to interpretation by the market, Zettelmeyer 
noted that the actual impact of the announcement may have been 
different.  
The asset pricing model for the exchange rate given in Engel and West 
(2010) and further elaborated in Munro (2014) implies that use of 
short-term interest rates as a measure of risk free return ruled out the 
possibility that the risk adjustment component in interest rate may cancel 
that of the exchange rate and, as a result, ignored the risk premium 
components of the interest rate.  
 
2.2 Monetary policy variables 
 
Monetary policy variables are the channels through which monetary 
shocks are transmitted to the market. Rudebusch (1998) suggested 
utilising rates from the federal funds futures contracts, rather than short 
term interest rates, as such a channel. This avoided the problem that the 
interest rate residuals from the VAR were assumed uncorrelated with 
financial market shocks. In financial markets, shocks in futures markets 
may differ from the VAR interest rate residuals. This conjecture was 
supported by the lack of fit of the shocks estimated from the VAR to the 
ones based on the federal funds futures contracts. Short-term interest 
rates are used in Zettelmeyer (2004) and Dungey and Fry (2009) for a New 
Zealand study. Other measures of monetary policy shocks include changes 
in base money (M1) in Cushman and Zha (1997) and Wilkinson et al. 
(2001), changes in non-borrowed reserves in Koray and McMillin (1999), 
Kim (2001), and Faust and Rogers (2003).  
Bernanke and Blinder (1992) indicate that changes in short term 
interest rates are dominated by monetary policy shocks but are not as 
sensitive to other influences. Therefore, short term interest rates are more 
informative in indicating monetary policy shocks compared to other 
indicators. The market interest rate is the monetary authority’s interest 
rate plus a risk premium. In addition, for an event study whereby the event 
window is 24 hours long or shorter, such as the present study, unexpected 
changes in the relative short-term interest rate would be the most 
appropriate measure of relevant monetary shocks. This gives rise to the 
central bank’s base interest gazette (the OCR in New Zealand).  
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2.3 Empirical evidence for or against ERP 
 
Dornbusch’s (1976) well known exchange rate overshooting hypothesis 
states that an interest rate increase leads to an immediate appreciation in 
the nominal exchange rate, in line with uncovered interest parity. The 
so-called ERP occurs when the overshooting hypothesis is inconsistent 
with data, or when a contractionary monetary policy shock is followed by 
a depreciation of the domestic currency. Sims (1992) noted that increases 
in the money supply were associated with appreciation of the exchange 
rate in France and in Germany (but not in Japan, the United Kingdom or 
the United States). Grilli and Roubini (1995) find that while positive 
innovations in U.S. interest rates lead to an impact appreciation of the U.S. 
dollar, positive innovations in the interest rates of the other G-7 countries 
are associated with an impact depreciation of their currency. They offer 
two explanations for such a puzzle; one is that the U.S. is the “leader” 
country in the setting of monetary policy for the G-7 area, while the other 
countries are “followers”. The other explanation suggests endogenous 
policy reaction to underlying inflationary shocks that are a cause of 
exchange rate depreciation. Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), Lewis (1995), 
Cushman and Zha (1997), Hardouvelis (1988), Bonser-Neal, Roley, and 
Gordon (1998), and Kim and Roubini (2000), to name just a few more, have 
all examined the relationship between monetary policy shocks and 
exchange rates movements in different countries and found conflicting 
results.  
For New Zealand, Wilkinson et al. (2001) found that a contraction in 
monetary policy may lead to a depreciation of the NZD, hence the 
existence of the ERP. Zettelmeyer (2004) used the event study approach 
and found no evidence for the ERP. Kearns and Manners (2006), using the 
event study approach with intraday data, found no evidence for the ERP 
for Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and United Kingdom.  
  
B. Hu, Y. Lin and P. Dalziel / Journal of Economic Research 24 (2019) 223-246  229 
 
3 Modelling framework 
3.1 The exchange rate model 
 
In this paper, we attempt to explain the impact of monetary policy 
shock on the exchange rate of NZ/US currency using the asset pricing 
model (APM) due to Engel and West (2010). The authors found that 
exchange rate and future fundamentals are highly correlated and this 
relationship is consistent with an asset pricing model for the exchange rate. 
Under the APM, the relationship between exchange rate and interest rate 
is empirically closer to theory than under other models. This finding is 
backed up by Monro (2014). Following the authors, we use lower case 
letters to denote logarithms to specify the unconditional mean of the real 
exchange rate as, 
 
ݍ௧ = −ܴ௧ −	Λ௧ + ݍത     (1) 
 
The ܴ௧ is the relative return defined as ∑ ܧ௧ஶ௝ୀ଴ ൫ݎ௧ା௝ே௓ − ݎ௧ା௝௎ௌ ൯, and the 
Λ௧  is the risk premium for holding the US dollar and is defined as ∑ ܧ௧ஶ௝ୀ଴ ߣ௧ା௝. The ݎ௧௄ is the real interest rate for country K, 	ܭ ∈ {ܼܰ, ܷܵ}, 
which equals the nominal interest rate divided by the expected inflation 
rate, namely, ݎ௧௄ 	≡ 	 ݅௧௄ − ܧ௧ߨ௧ାଵ௄ .  The ߣ௧ , defined as ݎ௧௎ௌ − ݎ௧ே௓  + 
ܧ௧ݍ௧ାଵ − ݍ௧ , is the excess return on US interest-bearing assets computed 
as the real interest rate differential between the US and NZ taking into 
account the expected real exchange rate change over the next period. The 
ݍത is the long-run equilibrium exchange rate. Munro (2014) found that 
large changes in Λ௧ occurred during financial turmoil periods, such as the 
Asia Financial Crisis, the 911 terrorist attack, and the GFC. 
Considering that the relative returns may also be subject to shocks to 
the risk premium, Munro (2014) suggests to model the real exchange rate 
and the relative return simultaneously, namely, 
 
ݍ௧ = −ߙܴ௧ −	ܧ௧Λ௧ + ݍത    (2) 
 
ܴ௧ = ܴ௧௙ − ߛܧ௧Λ௧      (3) 
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where ߙ is an unknown constant to accommodate the possible scenarios 
that the relative return is not fully priced into the level of the real exchange 
rate (|ߙ| < 1); and similarly, the free parameter, ߛ, allows for the possibility 
of a differential effect of the risk premium on the relative return and the 
real exchange rate. The risk-free component of the relative return, ܴ௧௙, is 
equal to the relative expected value of the inverse of the sum of all future 
consumption discount factors (page 5, Munro 2014).  
Engel and West (2005) find that relative economic fundamentals, such as, 
inflation differentials, interest rate differentials, follow a random walk 
process, namely, ܺ௧ = ܺ௧ିଵ + ߟ௧ଡ଼, ܺ ∈ (ܴ௙ , Λ). Therefore, ܴ௧  and Λ௧  in 
equations (2) and (3) can be viewed as being made up of past shocks, 
which implies that the percentage change in the level of the exchange rate 
is driven by shocks to relative returns of the NZ and US currencies, and 
shocks to the risk premium of holding the US currency. Since the interest 
is in modelling changes in the exchange rate, equations (2) and (3) are 
written in first difference forms, 
 
∆ݍ௧ = −ߙ∆ܴ௧ −	ߟ௧ஃ     (4) 
∆ܴ௧ = ߟ௧ோ೑ − ߛߟ௧ஃ      (5) 
 
where ߟ௧ோ೑ and ߟ௧ஃ are the shocks to the relative risk-free return and the 
risk premium, respectively. Because the relative risk-free return is assumed 
to follow a random walk process, ߟ௧ோ೑ can be estimated by ∆ܴ௧௙, and as a 
result, ߟ௧ஃ  can be estimated upon obtaining an estimate of ߛ  from 
equation (5)2.  
The first difference forms of the model as given by equations (4) and (5) 
fit well the event study approach that the present research adopts whereby 
an event is an OCR announcement by the RBNZ; and the first differences 
of the variables straddle the event window. The event window for the 
present study is the 24-hour period to 11:00 am on the OCR 
announcement day, thus Δ ܺ௧ 	 = ܺ௧ - ܺ௧ିଵ	 , X ∈ {݅௙_ே௓ , ݅௙_௎ௌ , 
ߟோ೑_ಿೋ, ߟோ೑_ೆೄ, ߟஃ_୒୞, ߟஃ_୙ୗ}; t and t-1 are 11:00am on the announcement 
day and the same time the previous day. The timeframe of the event 
window corresponds to the 24-hour period to 5pm in the previous day in 
                                                                  
2 Munro (2014) estimated the model coefficients using a Bayesian methodology. 
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the US (or 6pm or 7pm, depending on whether day-light saving is on in 
either country, more detailed information is in Appendix).  
The ߟ௧ோ೑  encapsulates three categories of random factors that affect 
monetary policy, namely, first, those that make monetary policy deviate 
from the set path; second, unexpected change in monetary policy; and 
third, expectations about future monetary policy that are not reflected in 
the short-term interest rate. Over the sample period 23 October 2003 – 30 
January 2014, there are three US Federal Open Market Committee 
meetings (FOMC) (The details are in the Appendix) that overlap the 
24-hour window. To rule out possible simultaneous effects of both US and 
NZ policy announcements for the three dates (events), these three 
particular observations will be excluded in the regression analysis below. 
Thus, we can expect that for the remaining events, the ߟ௧ோ೑ should only 
contain shocks originated from NZ monetary policy surprises.  
Equations (4) and (5) provide a framework for simultaneously 
modelling return and exchange rate, and show that the dynamic processes 
of the two variables are purely driven by shocks to relative risk-free return 
and currency premium. The ߙ in (4) measures the impact of a shock to 
risk-free return on the change in the exchange rate provided the 
correlation between ߟ௧ோ೑ and ߟ௧ஃ is zero. Munro (2014) finds that such a 
correlation was insignificantly different from zero for eight currency pairs 
including the NZ-US pair for the period December 1989-July 2013. 
However, such an estimate of ߙ will capture the compound effects of the 
three forces as mentioned above which is not exactly what is needed for 
the purpose of the present study which aims for evaluating the 
contribution of a monetary policy shock to exchange rate changes.  
 
3.2 Measure of monetary policy shock 
 
Since this study uses the event-study approach, identification of 
monetary policy shocks does not involve sifting through regression 
residuals like the VAR approach but focuses on the exogeneity and 
unexpectedness of each policy action under study. Unlike Zettelmeyer, the 
instrument used in the present paper is a market based measure of OCR 
surprises and therefore should be more capable of capturing market 
reactions than the direction variable. More specifically, the study uses the 
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difference between the actual OCR level and the market OCR expectation 
for the OCR announcement day (Monetary Policy Statements and OCR 
Reviews).  
In New Zealand, the overnight indexed swap rates (OIS) securities are 
an “over-the-counter” derivative on the OCR, where an agreement is made 
to exchange the compounded return of the realised OCR on a notional 
initial principle over a future period against the return based on a 
specified OIS rate. The	market	OCR	expectations,	 ܱܥܴതതതതതത, are formed one day 
before the OCR announcement day. Since the ܱܥܴതതതതതത are not subject to the 
endogeneity (reverse causality) problem as discussed in Zettelmeyer (2004), 
changes in the short-term interest rate that are only attributable to 
changes in ܱܥܴതതതതതത are deemed the size of the impact of monetary policy 
shock perceived by the market. As the instrument for the short-term 
interest rate, changes in ܱܥܴതതതതതത not only capture the directions of the shock 
but also the magnitude of it and hence is more informative than the 
underlying direction variable in Zettelmeyer (2004).  
Apart from using as the instrumental variable a market based measure 
of policy, the present paper also differs from Zettelmeyer’s in terms of the 
channel through which monetary shocks are transmitted to the market. In 
Zettelmeyer, the 90-day interest rate is used as the channel to transmit 
policy shocks, while the present paper uses shocks to the unobservable risk 
free return. As Munro (2014) demonstrated, in the exchange market, only 
risk-free returns matter and interest rates account for a minor share of 
exchange rate variances. Thus, we chose to use risk-free return shocks to 
be instrumented OCR surprises and to explain the exchange rate 
movements.  
Since a monetary policy shock directly affects risk-free return, 
evaluation of the effect of OCR surprises on exchange rate calls for a 
correlation analysis relating the aforementioned surprises to the resulting 
changes in the exchange rate, with the risk-free return as the transmitting 
media. Given that ∆ܴ௧  is the relative real asset return of NZ to US, 
equation (5) implies that the ߟ௧ோ೑  component of the relative return in 
general should be made up of the shock to NZ risk free return, ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ, and 
that to US risk free return, ߟ௧ோ೑_ೆೄ. Because, during either of the window 
periods, only in New Zealand is there a policy change or policy 
expectation; and Δ݅௧௎ௌ can be considered equal to 0 since the federal funds 
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rate stayed unchanged, ߟ௧ோ೑_ೆೄ  can be ignored from ߟ௧ோ೑ . Therefore, the 
task becomes to extract the component of ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ， ߟሶ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ， that is 
attributable to monetary policy shock originated from New Zealand. The 
ߟሶ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ is deemed zero if the level of the announced OCR is in accordance 
with the market expectation over the window period. Before extracting 
ߟሶ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ from ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ, it is necessary to estimate the latter first.  
Given the statistical evidence reported in Engel and West (2005) and the 
argument presented in Munro (2014), the level of New Zealand risk free 
return can be written as a random walk process and the level of New 
Zealand real asset return can be written as the level of risk free return plus 
a currency risk premium, namely, 
 
ܴ௧௙_ே௓ = ܴ௧ିଵ௙_ே௓ + ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ      (6) 
 
ܴ௧ே௓ = ܴ௧௙_ே௓ + v௧ே௓     (7) 
 
Equations (6) and (7) comprise a state space model with the level of risk 
free return, ܴ௧௙_ே௓, as the state variable and real asset return, ܴ௧ே௓, as the 
observed variable. The disturbance term, v௧ே௓, as suggested by equation (2), 
is predominantly currency risk premium. The empirical evidence 
presented in Munro (2014, Table 4) shows that the correlation between 
ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ  and ߟ௧ஃ_୒୞  is not significantly different from zero. Because Λ௧ே௓ 
follows a near random walk process (Engel and West, 2005), Λ௧ே௓ can be 
viewed as being made up by the present and all the past ߟஃ_୒୞, and the 
near zero correlation between ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ  and ߟ௧ஃ_୒୞ should imply a near zero 
correlation between ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ  and Λ௧ே௓. Therefore, the ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ  can then be 
backed out by applying Kalman filter to the system.  
To extract ߟሶ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ  econometrically amounts to projecting ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ  into 
the space spanned by the differences between actual OCRs and market 
OCR expectations; which are used as the measure of monetary policy 
shock. Denote	 the	 Kalman	 filter	 estimate	 of	 ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ 	 by	 ̂ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ 	and market 
surprises by Δܱܥܴതതതതതത(= ܱܥܴതതതതതത − ܱܥܴ) , then the fitted value from the 
regression in equation (8) is taken to be the estimate of ߟሶ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ, the impact 
on the risk free return of the monetary policy shock. 
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̂ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ  = ߛଵ + ߛଶΔܱܥܴതതതതതത௧ + ߳௧     (8) 
 
Thus, we instrument shocks to risk free return by OCR surprises since 
OCR surprises are absorbed by the exchange market via the channel of 
expected relative return which, in turn, is determined by risk free return. In 
essence, the least squares estimation of equation (8) addresses the 
possibility that the risk free return may be affected by factors that also 
affect the changes in the OCR.  
To arrive at an econometric model suitable for the present study, a 
general functional form for combining equations (4) and (5) may be 
written as ∆ݍ௧= ݂(ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ, ߟ௧ோ೑_ೆೄ, ߟ௧ஃ). Ignoring the shocks to US risk free 
returns (the reasons were discussed above), substituting ߟሶ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ  by its 
estimate, ߟሶመ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ, from equation (8) and assuming a linear functional form 
gives the two-variable model 
 
∆ݍ௧=ߙ + ߚఎߟሶመ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ + ߦ௧      (9) 
 
where the error term ߦ  consists of the currency premium, ߟ௧ஃ , and 
non-monetary policy shocks (ߟ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ − ߟሶ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ). Equation (9) is similar to 
Zettelmeyer’s model that the expected change in the exchange rate within 
the window is only attributable to shocks generated by unexpected 
monetary policy changes. The shocks that enter the model are the shocks 
to the risk free return specified in equation (6), which, in turn, is a reflection 
of monetary policy shock generated by the OCR announcement.  
Zettelmeyer (2004) found that adding controls to the two-variable 
model did not change the modelling outcomes. Since our sample period 
covers the GFC which Zettelmeyer’s did not, our second model 
specification includes a control variable to account for possible GFC 
impact on the relationship between the exchange rate and shocks to NZ’s 
risk free return. This model is given as equation (10) below. 
 
∆ݍ௧=ߙ + ߙீி஼ܦீி஼ + ߚఎߟሶመ௧ோ೑_ಿೋ + ߚீி஼ߟሶመ௧ோ೑_ಿೋܦீி஼ + ߦ௧ (10) 
 
The model given in equation (10) allows hypothesis-testing about 
whether there is asymmetrical response of the exchange rate to monetary 
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policy shocks between the GFC and non-GFC periods. There are two sets 
of estimates for both equations (9) and (10), corresponding to the two types 
of swap rates used to measure the relative return in equation (7).  
4 Data and empirical results 
4.1 Data 
 
RBNZ collects exchange rate data on a daily basis at 11:00am and 
5:10pm. Thus, there are two sizes for our event window that straddles the 
OCR announcement. One is a 24-hour window, that is, the 24-hour period 
to 11:00am on the OCR announcement day. The 24-hour window based on 
the 5:10pm data is disregarded simply because the amount of time elapsed 
from the announcement to the end of the window is too large for any 
change in the interest rates to be only subject to the announcement. The 
other one is the 18-hour window, namely, from 5:10pm on the day before 
the announcement through 11am on the announcement day. Figures 1 
shows the changes in the exchange rates for both the 24-hour and 18-hour 
windows. The window size did not seem to matter since the two series 
almost trace over each other.  
 
Figure 1. 
 
 
The entire sample period starts from 23 October 2003 to 30 January 
2014, for which the OCR expectation data are available. But the 5:10pm 
data only begin in September 2006, which means a loss of about a quarter 
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of the total observations if the 18-hour window sample is used instead of 
the 24-hour one. Nevertheless, the shortened window width should 
increase the likelihood that the differences in the exchange rate between 
11:00am on the OCR announcement days and 5:10pm the day before were 
only driven by events occurring shortly after the announcement time. 
Therefore, the smaller sample will be utilised to provide a “second opinion” 
for estimates based on the full sample. The sample period also includes the 
global financial crisis, which allows statistical testing of the significance of 
the GFC in altering the effects of monetary policy shocks on the exchange 
rate. Since March 1999, the OCR has been the instrument for the RBNZ to 
implement its monetary policy. In general, the RBNZ reviews the OCR 
eight times in each year, and makes adjustments deemed necessary. The 
dates for possible changes are announced in advance, so that the financial 
markets can anticipate the direction and level of any change with 
whatever public knowledge is available at the time. This includes the 
possibility of an announcement that there will be no change. The ܱܥܴതതതതതത are 
constructed using the OIS due to Krippner (2009); the actual OCR changes 
and OCR shocks, both in percentage points, are presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  
 
 
For the real relative return between NZ and US, two measures are 
constructed. One is based on the 10-year zero coupon swaps rate 
(Bloomberg codes: I04910y Index and I05210Y Index, respectively, for NZ 
and US data); the other is based on the 10-year plain vanilla swaps rate 
(Bloomberg codes: NDSW10 Curncy and USSW10 Curncy, respectively, 
for NZ and US data). Due to lack of daily inflation data in either country, 
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the relative return is deflated using quarterly CPIs because the highest 
frequency of NZ CPI is quarterly (Bloomberg codes: NZCPCCPI Index 
and CPURNSA Index, respectively, for NZ and US, rebased on the June 
quarter 2006). Figure 3 shows the changes in the NZ-US relative real 
returns based on the 10-year zero coupon swap rate and the 10-year plain 
vanilla swap rate, on the OCR announcement dates.  
The expected relative real return between NZ and US had to be 
constructed. Following Munro (2014), relative nominal returns over the 
next 10 years are summed and deflated by the expected future relative 
inflation rate. Two measures of relative nominal returns are considered, 
namely, the 10-year zero coupon swaps rate and the 10-year plain vanilla 
swap rate. The expected future relative inflation rate is calculated as a 
forward sum of forecast values based on an AR(1) process. In Munro (2014), 
the coefficient was estimated to be 0.88 for the NZ-US exchange rate for 
period December 1994 – July 2013. Considering that our sample largely 
overlaps with Munro’s, we also use 0.88 for constructing this particular 
variable; however, two variations are included as well, which are 0.91 and 
0.85 to check sensitivity of estimation results to the value of the coefficient. 
The plots of both types of swap rates constructed using 0.88 are presented 
in Figure 3.  
 
Figure 3.  
 
 
Table 1 provides a comparison of the present study with two recent 
studies using the event-study approach to examining the relation between 
monetary policy shocks and the NZ exchange rate. The comparison 
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reveals that the present study not only uses a larger sample, but employs 
an asset pricing model to address differentials in returns between the two 
countries and currency risks. The instrumental variable in Zettelmeyer’s 
study is a discrete variable with three values, namely, -1, 0, and 1; such 
trichotomy certainly limits the correlation between the instrumental 
variable and the interest rate which is a continuous variable. The 
instrument in the present study is a continuous variable and has a high 
correlation with the continuous real relative return variable. The 
expansion of the sample also allows for testing of the statistical 
significance of GFC in altering the relations between monetary policy 
shocks and the exchange rate. 
 
Table 1. A comparison of the present study to other event studies 
 Zettelmeyer (2004) 
Kearns and 
Manners (2006) 
This Research 
Model/Estimation 
Method 
Two-stage least 
squares 
Ordinary least 
squares 
Asset pricing 
model/Kalman 
filter and least 
squares 
Event window 24 hours 
 
70 minutes for 
exchange rate, 24 
hours for interest 
rate 
24 and 18 hours 
Instrument 
Variable 
Future direction of 
monetary policy 
condition. 
N/A 
Market based OCR 
shocks 
Variables 
90-day interest rate 
Directions of 
monetary policy 
Nominal exchange 
rate 
 
30-day interest 
rate 
90-day interest 
rate 
Nominal exchange 
rate 
Real domestic and 
foreign relative 
returns 
Nominal exchange 
rate 
GFC indicator 
Sample period 
 
08/01/1990 ~ 
01/19/2000  
 
17/03/1999 ~ 
10/06/2004 
 
23/10/2003 ~ 
30/01/2014 
 
Observations 
 
35 
 
42 
 
83 
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4.2 Empirical results 
 
Table 2. Estimation results  
(10YZC: 10 year zero coupon swap rate; 10YVS: 10 year vanilla swap rate) 
Section A
 Eq. (8)
 10YZC 10YVS 
 γଵ 0.0092 0.0224 
 γଶ 0.4859** 0.7328*** 
 F stats 9.362*** 20.140*** 
Section B 
 24-hour 18-hour
Eq. (9) Eq. (10) Eq. (9) Eq. (10) 
10YZC 10YVS 10YZC 10YVS 10YZC 10YVS 10YZC 10YVS 
α 0.0006 0.0007 -0.0035 -0.0038 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0066 -0.0071 
βη -0.0061 -0.0040 0.0649** 0.0431** -0.0055 -0.0083 0.0853** 0.0566** 
αGFC  0.0055 0.0060 0.0073 0.0079 
βGFC  -0.0737** -0.0489** -0.0918** -0.0609** 
N 82 82 82 82 59 59 59 59 
R2 0.006 0.006 0.06 0.07 0.008 0.008 0.05 0.05 
 
The estimation results of equations (8), (9) and (10) are presented in 
Table 2 for both the window sizes and the two measures of real relative 
returns. Panel A of the table shows that OCR shocks are highly significant 
in explaining the shocks to the risk free returns that are part of the relative 
real returns. Therefore, there is strong evidence that the shocks to the risk 
free returns can be attributed to the OCR shocks. This supports 
instrumenting the shocks to risk free return by the OCR shocks to address 
mismeasurement due to non-policy economic shocks that happened to 
coincide with a policy announcement.  
Panel B presents the estimates of the magnitude and direction of 
changes in the exchange rate as a result of OCR shocks which are 
channelled through the risk free component of the expected relative real 
returns. The small R2 values are consistent with both Zettelmeyer (2004) 
and Kearns and Manners (2006). The baseline model of equation (9) has 
shown the insignificance of OCR shocks in explaining the movements in 
the exchange rate. However, controlling for the GFC effects has improved 
the model specification in terms of significance of model coefficients and 
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R2. For both the window sizes, the significances of the coefficients are 
determined using the corrected standard error estimates according to the 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent estimator 
to address possible serial correlations in the regression residuals. The 
contrast between the two model specifications of equations (9) and (10) 
may highlight the importance of the GFC in mediating the relationship. In 
that sense, estimation based on equation (9) would suffer from an omitted 
variable bias. 
Interpretations of the responses in terms of OCR shocks need refer to 
the first stage regression results in panel A of Table 2 which indicates that 
if the OCR shock increases by 100 basis points, the shock to the risk free 
return will increase by 0.4859 percentage points for zero coupon based 
relative real return, and 0.7382 percentage points for the vanilla based 
relative real return. The estimated responses of the exchange rate to 
monetary policy shocks are found to be 6.5 (0.0649 × 100) and 4.3 (0.0431 × 
100) percentage points, respectively, for the zero coupon based and vanilla 
based relative real returns, for the 24-hour window period; these responses 
increased to 8.5 (=0.0853 × 100) and 5.7 (=0.0566 × 100) percentage points 
for the 18-hour window. Thus, a positive OCR shock of 100 basis points 
would cause the exchange rate to depreciate by about 3.2 percentage 
points (=6.5 × 0.4859 and 4.3 × 0.7382) for both the measures of relative real 
returns for the 24-hour window, and about 4.1 percentage points (= 8.5 × 
0.489 and 5.3 × 0.7382) for the 18-hour window. Hence, there is evidence 
for ERP. However, during the GFC period, a positive OCR shock of 100 
basis points would appreciate the NZ currency by 0.43 3  or 0.32 4 
percentage points, depending on the measure of the relative real return 
and window size; the ERP was absent. 
The response of the exchange rate to the monetary shock behaved 
differently during the GFC and non-GFC periods. In particular, for a 
contractionary monetary policy shock the exchange rate depreciated 
before and after the GFC period and appreciated slightly during the GFC 
period; and there is a stark difference in magnitude of the response of the 
exchange rate to monetary shock between the two periods. Such a 
contrast pattern is also found in Vithessonthi (2014) in the case of Thailand 
                                                                  
3 (0.0649 – 0.0737) × 100 × 0.4859 ≈ -0.43 and (0.0431 – 0.0489) × 100 × 0.7328 ≈ -0.43 
4 (0.0853 – 0.0918) × 100 × 0.4859 ≈ -0.32 and (0.0566 – 0.0609) × 100 × 0.7328 ≈ -0.32 
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for the Thai baht and the Japanese Yen exchange rate. An explanation 
offered in Vithessonthi (2014) regarding the difference in magnitude is that 
during the GFC period capital flight from the US resulted in large capital 
inflows to safer countries which may moderate the response of the spot 
exchange rate to monetary policy surprises.  
5 Conclusions 
In recent years, a high exchange rate has created difficulties for New 
Zealand’s export sectors. Some commentators have put pressure on the 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand to lower the highly appreciated New 
Zealand dollar by relaxing monetary policy. Although there have been 
previous studies examining the relationship between monetary policy 
shocks and exchange rate movements, there has not been enough research 
focusing on how monetary policy shocks influence the exchange rate since 
the RBNZ adopted the Official Cash Rate as its monetary policy 
instrument in March 1999. The research reported in this paper was carried 
out to examine the relationship between monetary policy shocks and New 
Zealand exchange rate movements since that date, taking into account 
possible influence from the global financial crisis.  
Coupling an event study approach with an asset pricing model, this 
research employed data for the period October 2003-January 2014 and 
found evidence for the ERP in New Zealand for the pre- and post-GFC 
periods. The GFC has significantly altered how the exchange rate 
responded to monetary policy shocks in that the ERP was absent for the 
period. This finding shows that exchange rate return reacted 
asymmetrically to monetary policy surprises during the GFC period. 
Additionally, the effect of a monetary policy surprise on the exchange rate 
change was stronger during the financial crisis period. It is, however, 
necessary to point out that the low R2s in the regressions showed a limited 
role that monetary policy shock had in determining exchange rate 
movements. This result is consistent with some previous studies. 
Eichenbaum and Evans (1995), for example, noted that monetary policy 
was important to maintain stable economic development, but the 
movements of exchange rate are not exclusively determined by monetary 
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policy shocks. In addition, Dalziel (2002) and Karim, Lee and Gan (2007) 
also argued that monetary policy shocks only explain relatively small 
changes of exchange rate movements.  
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Appendix 
 
 
24-hour period in the US corresponding to the 24 hours to 11am in 
Auckland 
 US Daylight saving US Non-Daylight saving 
NZ Daylight saving 6pm-6pm (previous day) 5pm-5pm (previous day) 
NZ Non-Daylight saving 7pm-7pm (previous day) Nonexistent 
 
 
18-hour period in the US corresponding to the 18 hours to 11am in 
Auckland 
 US Daylight saving US Non-Daylight saving 
NZ Daylight saving 12am-6pm (previous day) 11pm-5pm (previous day) 
NZ Non-Daylight saving 1am-7pm (previous day) Nonexistent 
 
 
Dates when ߟ௧ோ೑_ೆೄ may not be ignorable and hence are excluded in the 
estimation 
NZ OCR Announcement Dates USA FOMC Meeting Dates 
31/01/2013 29-30/01/2013 
31/10/2013 29-30/10/2013 
30/01/2014 28-29/01/2014 
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Estimation results of equations (9) and (10): ߩగ =0.91 and ߩగ =0.85 
ρ஠ =0.91 
Section A
 Eq. (8)
 10YZC 10YVS 
 γଵ 0.0027 0.01600 
 γଶ 0.6929** 0.93987*** 
Section B 
 
24-hour 18-hour
Eq. (9) Eq. (10) Eq. (9) Eq. (10) 
10YZC 10YVS 10YZC 10YVS 10YZC 10YVS 10YZC 10YVS 
ߙ 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0030 -0.0033 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0059 -0.0065 
ߚఎ -0.0043 -0.0031 0.0455** 0.0336** -0.0058 -0.0043 0.0600** 0.0441** 
ߙீி஼  0.0050 0.0055 0.0067 0.0073 
ߚீி஼  -0.0517** -0.0381** -0.0644** -0.0475** 
N 82 82 82 82 59 59 59 59 
ܴଶ 0.006 0.006 0.06 0.07 0.008 0.008 0.05 0.05 
***: significant at 1%; **: significant at 5%; *: significant at 10%  
 
ρ஠ =0.85 
Section A 
 Eq. (8)
 10YZC 10YVS 
 γଵ 0.0130 0.0263 
 γଶ 0.3625** 0.6095*** 
Section B 
 
24-hour 18-hour 
Eq. (9) Eq. (10) Eq. (9) Eq. (10) 
10YZC 10YVS 10YZC 10YVS 10YZC 10YVS 10YZC 10YVS 
ߙ 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0040 -0.0042 -0.0014 -0.0014 -0.0066 -0.0076 
ߚఎ -0.0081 -0.0048 0.0870** 0.0518** -0.0111 -0.0066 0.0853** 0.0680** 
ߙீி஼   0.0062 0.0064   0.0073 0.0084 
ߚீி஼   -0.0987** -0.0587**   -0.0918** -0.0732** 
N 82 82 82 82 59 59 59 59 
ܴଶ 0.006 0.006 0.06 0.07 0.008 0.008 0.05 0.05 
 
